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FAMILY AND PARENTAL LEAVE STATUTES: A STATUS REPORT 
by 
Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey* 
INTRODUCTION 
Con9ress was unable to override President Bush's veto of legislat1on that would have provided mandated leave, upon 
request, to employees of private companies for "famil¥ related" purposes--birth of a child, adoption of a ch1ld, or 
to care for sick or disabled family members. However, nineteen states and the District of Columbia have passed such legislation. Of that number, nine states and the District of Columbia have passed laws mandating leave for both parental 
and family reasons, and ten states require leave for birth 
and/or adoption of a child only (parental leave). Congress has vowed to revisit the issue at its next opportunity, and it 
is highly probable that a federal family leave bill will be 
passed into law during the Clinton administration. 
A comparison of the states' parental and family leave statutes reveals wide variations in provisions. This gives 
rise to a number of questions. Should the federal government pass a family or parental leave law to insure uniform protection to employees and avoid the problems of wide differences between the laws of one state and the laws of another? Would a Uniform Family Leave Act accomplish the 
major objectives of a federal statute while still allowing states some discretion to consider the impact of such laws on 
their unique business environments? Should emplo¥ers be free of the requirements of any such legislation and, 1n lieu of those laws, be encouraged through tax benefits or other 
governmental assistance to provide leave to employees for family related purposes? In light of demographic trends 
indicating higher percenta9es of women, minorities, and disabled persons entering 1nto the workforce [1], employers might prefer to offer cafeteria style benefits to their 
diverse workforces (including, as an option, parental or family leave) rather than be required by law to grant one type 
of benefit at the risk of having to forego others [2]. 
The primary focus of this paper is on parental and/or family leave laws, although maternity and pregnancy leave laws 
* Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, Fairleigh Dickinson University 
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will also be addressed . Since there are inconsistencies in 
the labellin9 of the 'various types of leaves, it is suggested here that un1form labels be adopted as described below. 
The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
as amended by the Disability Act led many states to enact statutes requi 1ng that leave be granted to an employee 
who 9ives birth. Su leave may or may not include a period of t1me for the care f the newborn as distinguished from time 
to heal and recuperate from the act of giving birth. These leaves are usually called "maternity" or "pregnane¥" leaves, 
but are sometimes referred to as "medical," "disab1lity," 
"parental," "child care," or "family" leaves. 
It is recommended here that those labels be refined and 
used as follows: "Maternity" and "pregnancy" leave should 
refer to leave for a female emplo¥ee in relation to the birth of that employee's child. To be 1n compliance with federal 
law, such leave should be equal to or greater than, but not less than, leave made available to employees for other temporar¥ disabilities [3]. "Parental" leave should refer to leave wh1ch is granted to care for a newborn or newly adopted child. The EEOC uses the term "parental leave" to refer to 
leave which is taken "to care for a child of any age, or to develop a healthy parent-child relationship, or to help a family adjust to the presence of a newborn or adopted child" (4). "Family" leave should refer to leave for the purpose of caring for a sick or disabled--family member, or for some other 
family-related reason. "Medical" and "disability" leave should refer to leave for the employee who cannot work due to 
his or her own temporary disability or illness. 
The states' parental and family leave statutes ride a 
continuum from minimum to maximum concern for employer needs . The statutory provisions of the several family/parental leave 
laws are presented below with comments indicating which are the most and the least favorable to employers. Also addressed 
is whether the provisions of the laws pose any significant legal problems; and, where appropriate, comparisons are made with the federal bill which was vetoed b¥ President Bush. The paper concludes with a discussion compar1ng the advantages and 
disadvantages of enacting federal law on the subject, 
formulating a Uniform Parental/Famil¥ Leave Act, leaving the matter completely to the states' leg1slators, or, conversely, 
discouraging passage of more legislation in this area at 
either the state or federal level. 
The twenty statutes which provide for mandated parental 
andfor family leave for private sector have been 
divided into two categories: Section I l1sts and describes those which for both parental and famil¥ leave, and Section II 11sts and describes those which requ1re leave only 
for birth and/or adoption of a child (including maternity and pregnancy leave laws). Section III describes statutor¥ 
provisions in four states' laws which provide alternat1ve means of addressing family concerns in employment. 
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For purposes of this pap7r, only statutes to 
private sector employers are 1ncluded. Laws wh1ch perta1n 
only to public sector employers are not covered. 
I. COMPREHENSIVE STATUTES MANDATING BOTH PARENTAL AND 
FAMILY LEAVE. 
Nine states and the District of Columbia require both 
parental and famil¥ leave. Those states are California, Connecticut, Hawai1, Maine, New Jerse¥, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
washin9ton, and Wisconsin. In analyz1ng.these laws, the 
follow1ng items were selected for compar1son: 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
Provisions as to who is a "child" whose birth or 
adoption triggers the right to mandated leave. 
The circumstances under which family leave is to 
be granted. . Provisions indicating what constitutes an 1llness 
for purposes of family leave. . The number of employees needed to br1ng an 
employer within the coverage of the law. Employee's rights and remedies under the act. 
The employee's right to reinstatement. The employer's right to require notice and/or 
certification to confirm the need for the leave. 
Length of the mandated leave period. The employer's right to deny or limit leave. 
Effects of leave on employee benefits. 
A. Provisions as to who is a "child" whose birth 
or adopt1on tr1ggers the r1ght to mandated leave. 
All the statutes in Section I require employers to grant 
"parental" leave for both birth and adoption of a child. Leave granted for birth of a child always to a natural 
or biological child. With re9ard to adopt1on, the 
differ. California's (5) def1nition for purposes of 
includes a requ1rement of dependency status. connect1cut s 
(6) definition of child is limited 1s under the.age of 18 or who is a dependent due to 1nab1l1ty to care for h1m 
or herself. New Jersey (7J and Wisconsin [8) ar7 to Connecticut in the1r def1n1tion of ch1ld. The D1str1ct of 
Columbia's [9J statute mandates leave for an employee w1th 
whom a ch1ld 1s placed--even when such placement is not for 
purposes of adoption, i.e:, as long as the employee ... . permanently assumes and d1schar9es parental respons1b1l1t1es 
for such a child. As such, it 1s the only statute which does 
not require a legal relationship to who is a.child for either a leave granted when such ch1ld 1s placed w1th the 
employee or leave granted to care for such a child up?n his or 
her illness. Maine (10], Rhode Island [11], and Wash1ntton 
[12] limit the-aerin1tion of ch1ld for purposes of adop 10n by 
age: for Maine and Rhode Island the child must be 16 years of 
age or less, and for Washington, 5 years of age or less. 
Hawaii (13] neither broadens nor limits its definition of 
ch1ld for adoption purposes. 
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Oregon (14] provides for both parental and family leave 
in two separate statutes--one which makes it an unlawful 
employment practice to refuse to grant an employee's request 
for a parental leave of absence and one which for Family Medical Leave. Although Oregon is unl1ke the above 
states which provide the parental and family leave benefits in 
one comprehensive statute, it is included in Section I. Under 
Oregon's law a child, for purposes of requesting leave for 
adoption, is one who is under 6 years of age. 
Least Favorable to The District of Columbia's statute g1ves broadest pro ec 1on to employees by requ1r1ng 
leave for the placement of any child with an employee, 
regardless of the existence of a legal relationship with such 
a child, as long as the employee "assumes and discharges" 
parental responsibility for such a child. 
The federal bill's definition describes a "son or 
daughter" as a 11 b1olog1cal, adopted, or foster child, a 
stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a standing in 
loco parentis ..• " [15]. This definition 1s similar in scope 
to D.C.'s statute, and would preempt the state laws which have 
narrower definitions. 
Most Favorable to Em5loaers: Rhode Island and Maine, by omitt1ng def1n1t1ons of c 1l , could be narrowly construed, 
and thereby benefit employers. Washington and Oregon limit 
the definition of child in the case of adoption to children 5 years of age or less, the most restrictive of the statutes 
which limit the definitiQn of child for adoption purposes. 
B. The circumstances under which leave is to be granted. 
Family leave, which refers to leave 9ranted in order to 
enable an employee to care for a sick fam1ly member, is 
mandated in all the statutes included in Section I. However, 
the definitions of family member, child, spouse, and parent 
differ; the criteria which constitute an illness which 
entitles an employee to such leave varies; and the states are 
not in agreement as to whether family leave (with its 
guarantees of reinstatement and other benefits) includes the 
right of an employee to take leave for his or her own 
illness. The questions of when family leave is to be granted 
and who is considered a family member are addressed first. 
Connecticut [16], Maine [17], Rhode Island [18], and Wiscons1n [19] provide fam1ly leave for the employee's own 
1llness, a logical extension of the concerns expressed in the objectives of family leave laws. 
The federal bill includes a provision for leave to an 
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employee whose serious health condition makes the employee 
unable to perform the functions of his or her position (20]. 
All the statutes, except Washington, indicate that an 
employee is entitled to family leave to care for a serious health condition or serious illness of a child, spouse, or parent of the employee. Under Washington's law (21) employers must grant leave to employees to take care of a newborn or a newly adopted child under the age of 6 or a child under the 
age of 18 with a terminal health condition. There is no 
provision for leave to care for a spouse or parent. Interestingly, the law does provide that an employee's accrued sick leave can be used to care for a child under 18 who simply 
requires "treatment" or "supervision"--no other statute addresses leave to care for a child who is neither seriously nor terminally ill, but only mildly ill. 
The District of Columbia (22] has passed the only statute 
which includes 1n 1ts def1nition of family member a child who lives with the employee and for whom the permanently assumes and discharges parental responsibil1ty and a person 
with whom the employee shares or has shared, within the past year, a mutual residence and with whom the employee maintains 
a committed relationship. 
Least Favorable to Emploters: The District of Columbia has the broadest def1n1t1on o family member. It 1s the only one which includes .a . person with whom the employee shares 
or has shared a mutual residence and with whom the employee maintains a committed relationship. In addition, it includes 
as a child one who lives with the employee and for whom the employee permanently assumes and discharges parental resonsibility. This could include one who is the child of a 
live-in companion, whether or not a legal or blood relationship exists. 
Most Favorable to Employers: Washinlton does not require that leave be granted for the 1llness of am1ly members other than the child of the employee. 
c. Provisions indicating what constitutes an illness 
for purposes of fam1ly leave. 
California (23], Connecticut (241, the District of 
Columb1a (25], New Jerset (261, and W1sconsin (27] have substantially s1m1lar de init1ons for ser1ous health condition 
or serious illness: an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient 
care in a hospital or other health care facility, or continuing treatment or supervision by a health care provider. Wisconsin and Connecticut add the adjective 
"disabling" to the definition, a word that was found to be ambiguous in a Wisconsin case since it could mean any illness 
or injury that interferes with of daily functions, not necessarily one that is lim1ted to long-term illnesses or 
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conditions. In the same case, it was decided that the 
employee who took one day off for bronchitis was not entitled to protection from discharge under this law because the illness did not call for outpatient care with "continuing treatment" by a health care provider (28]. 
The Rhode Island (29] statute defines a seriously ill person as one who b¥ reason of an accident, disease, or condition is in imm1nent danger of death, or requires 
hospitalization involving an organ transplant, limb amputation or other procedure of similar severity. Maine's (30] 
definition is the same, except that it adds a third possibility: a mental or physical condition that requires 
constant in-home care. The Washington (31] statute, which limits family leave to care for an 111 child only, is further limited to a child with a "terminal health condition" one 
which is caused by injury, disease, or illness, that is incurable and will produce death within the period of the . 
leave. This very restrictive definition is softened somewhat by the state's law which requires employers to allow employees to use accrued sick leave to care for a child who requires treatment or supervision due to a "health condition." Hawaii (32) defines a serious health condition as "an acute, 
traumatic or life threatening illness, injury, or impairment that requires a physician's treatment or supervision." 
Oregon (33) defines serious health condition in more severe terms, such as a condition which poses an "imminent danger of death, is terminal in prognosis with a reasonable possibility of death in the near future," but also includes in 
the definition the more general "illness of a child of an employee requiring home care" and "any mental or physical condition that requires constant care." 
Least Favorable to Emplo¥ers: California, Connecticut, 
D.C., New Jersey, and W1scons1n entitle emplorees to broad protect1on w1th regard to reasons for request1ng family 
leave. However, the California law states that the condition must be one which "warrants the participation of a family member to provide the care." An employer could require 
evidence that the personal presence is necessary to care for the ill fam1ly member. 
Most Favorable to Employers: Hawaii and Rhode Island allow employees a r1ght to fam1ly leave only in very 
restricted circumstances involving a terminal prognosis for the ill family member. 
D. The number of emtloyees needed to bring the employer w1th1n he coverage of the law. 
The following list shows the number of employees an employer must have in order to be considered an "employer" 
under the law. They are in order, from the lowest number of employees to the highest. Some of the statutes staggered the 
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effectiveness of their laws, making the law applicable to employers with a higher number of employees in the first year, and reducing the number in later years (District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Connecticut). The numbers below represent the 
lowest final numbers provided in the various states' laws. 
District of Columbia (34) - 20 or more. Ma1ne [35] - 25 or more. (36)- 25 or more (for its parental leave law). 50 or more (for its family leave law). 
California (37) - 50 or more. 
New Jersey (38) - 50 or more. Rhode Island (39) - 50 or more. 
W1scons1n (40) - 50 or more. Connect1cut [41) - 75 or more. Rawa11 [42] - 100 or more. Wash1ngton (43) - 100 or more. 
Least Favorable to EmploSers: The District of Columbia's statute appl1es to a broaderase of employers (those w1th 20 or more employees) than any of the other states' laws. Also 
broad is Maine (25 or more employees). 
Most Favorable to EmaloSers: Hawaii and washington are the only ones wh1ch exclu eus1nesses w1th less than Ioo 
employees from the law's requirements, indicating a concern about the impact of the law on small businesses. 
The federal bill covers employers of 50 or more (44). 
E. Employees' rights and remedies under the act. 
The extent to which there is statutory language which grants the benefactors of the laws (the employees) specific remedies with which to enforce the rights established in the laws is an indication of the seriousness of purpose which the 
legislators brought to their deliberations of these parental 
and family leave statutes. The statutory provisions range from no mention of remedies (in which case it is presumed the 
employee can take civil action in a court of general jurisdiction) to several clauses allowing for civil penalties, punitive damages, and other relief. 
The New Jersef law (45) attempts to balance the interests of business aga1ns the state's acknowledged policy of protecting and promoting the stability and economic security 
of family units. It provides that, in addition to other relief or affirmative action permitted, a penalty of not more 
than $2000 for a first offense, and not more than $5000 for second and subsequent offenses will be assessed against violators. Also, punitive damages of up to $10,000 for an 
individual and $500,000 for a class action (or 1% of the net worth of the employer, whichever is less) can be awarded to plaintiffs, as well as reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. If the employer prevails, however, bad 
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faith must be shown in order recover attorney's fees. 
Other states which provide penalties against violators 
are Rhode Island (46), Washinfiton (47], and Maine (48). Rhode Island w1ll assess not more t an $1000 for eacn-day of a continuing violation; Washington will fine up to $200 for a 
first infraction and $1000 for each additional; and Maine provides liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day a violation continues. 
The District of Columbia (49J, Hawaii (50], Wisconsin (51], and Wash1ngton employ admin1strat1ve processes for parties seeking relief under these laws. Washington alone 
precludes the right of an employee to take civil action, but allows awards of reinstatement and backpay. Wisconsin requires filing with its agency within 30 days of the 
violation, and an attempt at conciliation will be made before a hearing will be given. After exhausting the 
administrative process, an employee may take civil action. In 
the District of Columbia a successful plaintiff may be awarded backpay plus interest, and up to three times that amount in 
consequential damages, medical expenses not covered by health insurance, and costs and reasonable attorney's fees. If the 
agenc¥ process goes beyond 150 days, the aggrieved employee may f1le a civil action. , 
Least Favorable to Employers: New Jersey specifically provides that an employee may seek pun1t1ve damages up to 
$10,000 for an individual. New Jersey also assesses the highest penalty on employers for violations--$2,000 for the 
first offense and up to $5,000 for each subsequent offense. 
The federal bill contains a provision unlike any of the 
state statutes. standing to any one or more employees for and in behalf of other employees to take action in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction against any employer, including a public agency (52). 
Most Favorable to Employers: Washinaton precludes a private r1ght of act1on for emplo¥ees, an assesses only a 
$200 fine for the first emplo¥er 1nfraction, and up to $1,000 for each infraction if violat1ons continue. A successful employee may be limited to reinstatement and backpay. 
F. Employee's right to reinstatement. 
California Connecticut (54], Rhode Island (55], and Wiscons1n [56] s1mply mandate re1nstatement of the employee to 
88 
his or her former position, or to a position with equivalent 
duties, pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. The remaining states, while acknowledging substantially the same right of reinstatement, qualify the 
right by recognizing exceptions which operate in favor of 
employers. Hawaii (57] and New Jersey (58) state that reinstatement can be denied rr-the employer experiences layoffs or workforce reductions and the employee would have lost the position if not on leave pursuant to a bona fide 
layoff and recall system. 
The District of Columbia (591 allows an to deny reinstatement to an employee who 1s among the h1ghest paid 10% 
of the employer's workforce if the employer can demonstrate that reinstatement would result in substantial economic injury to its operations. Oregon (601 and Washington [61] have similar language stat1ng that 1f the employer's circumstances have so changed that the employee cannot be reinstated to the 
former or equivalent job, the employee shall be reinstated to 
any other position that is available and suitable. Washington's statute goes on to state that the entitlement to 
reinstatement does not apply if the has been eliminated by a bona fide restructur1ng or reduction-in-force, the workplace has been moved to at least 60 miles away or is permanently or temporarily shut down for at least 30 days, or 
if the employee takes another job, or does not provide timely notice of his or her intent to take family leave, or did not return on the agreed-on-day. 
The broadest right to deny reinstatement is found in 
Maine's (62] law which states that reinstatement can be denied 1f the employer proves that the employee was not restored because of conditions unrelated to the employee's exercise of 
rights under this act. 
Least Favorable to Employers: The statutes which are silent as to the r1ght of an employer to deny reinstatement 
could prove most beneficial to employees. These include California, connecticut, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. 
Most Favorable to Employers: Those statutes which specif1cally recogn1ze the employer's right to deny 
reinstatement in particular circumstances are desirable for employers. In particular, Maine's catch-all exception provides a major loophole operat1ng in favor of employers. 
The federal bill contains an exemption for certain highly 
compensated employees--the highest paid 10 percent of the 
employees employed by the emplorer within 75 miles of the facility at which the employee 1s employed--which allows the employer to deny restoration to such if it is necessary to prevent substantial and gr1evous economic injury 
to the operations of the employer (63]. 
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All of the statutes require notice of the intent to take a leave unless the reasons for taking the leave are 
Connecticut (64] 2 weeks' notice; 
Ma1ne (65] and Rhode Island (66) re9u1re 30 days' notice; and tneothers requ1re "reasonable" not1ce. Washington [67] is the only state which requires written not1ce (3 days for 
leave and 14 days for family leave) . All except Ma1ne and Rhode Island state that employees should make 
efforts in leave dates to avoid d1srupt1ng the employer's bus1ness operations. 
All the statutes except Rhode Island specifically permit employers . to require from a physician or health care prov1der, and Connect1cut alone requires that the 
empl?yee provide a written .certificate from a physician 
stat1ng the nature of the 1llness and its probable duration. New Jerset (68], Washington, and Wisconsin (69] permit the employero obtain a second medical op1n1on at the employer's 
New Jersey and Washington adding that if there 1s a confl1ct between the two opinions, a third opinion may be sought--in New Jersey such party is chosen jointly. In the third is chosen by the other health care prov1ders. 
Oregon (70) and ,Washington laws provide that if the 
employee fails to provide notice as required the employer may reduce the leave period by 3 weeks. ' 
Least Favorable to By reason of its limited employee not1ce requ1remen s and its silence regarding the 
employer's right to require verification from a physician, Rhode Island shows less concern for employers. 
. Most Favorable to Washington has a 30-day wr1tten not1ce requ1remen , a concern for d1srupting the business operations of the employer, an allowance for an employer's demand for confirmation from a health care 
provider, plus the right of the emplorer to punish an employee who fails to abide by the notice requ1rements. 
H. Length of mandated leave period. 
The length of the mandated leave periods fall between 2 weeks in a 1-year period to 16 weeks in a 2-year period. In order from the shortest to the longest, they are: 
Wisconsin [71] - 2 weeks in a 1-year period for family leave. 6 weeks in a 1-year period for parental leave. 8 weeks in a 1-year period for a combination of leaves. 
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Hawaii [72] - 4 weeks in a 1-year period. 
Maine [73] - 10 weeks in a 2-year period. 
New Jersey [74] - 12 weeks in a 2-year period. 
Washington [75] - 12 weeks in a 2-year period. 
Oregon [76] - 12 weeks in a 2-year period for family leave. 
12 weeks in a restricted period of 
for parental leave.* 
Rhode Island [77] - 13 weeks in a 2-year period. 
Connecticut [78] - 16 weeks in a 2-year period. 
District of Columbia [79] - 16 weeks in a 2-year period. 
California [80] - 4 months in a 2-year period. 
time 
* Oregon's statute requires an employee to take the 
parental leave between the birth of the infant and the time 
the infant reaches 12 weeks of age. If the child was born 
prematurely, the 12-week period will be extended to the time 
the child will have reached the developmental stage equavalent 
to 12 weeks of age. For adoptions·, the leave must be within 
the 12-week period which begins when the employee takes 
physical custody of the child. 
The federal bill provides a total of 12 workweeks of 
leave during any 12-month period [81]. 
Least Favorable to California, Connecticut, 
and the D1str1ct of Columbia permit the longest leave per1ods 
for employees. 
Most Favorable to Emtloyers: Wisconsin provides only 2 
weeks 1n a 1-year per1odor family leave, by far the shortest 
leave period of all the statutes. 
I. Employer's right to deny leave. 
The statutes of California [82], Connecticut [83], the 
District of Columbia [84], New Jersey [85], Ore£on [86], and 
Wash1ngton [87] specificall¥ recogn1ze the r1gh of employers 
to den¥ parental and/or fam1ly leave to employees in certain 
situat1ons. The California, Connecticut, Oregon, and 
Washington laws allow employers to restrict the combined leave 
of a husband and wife to the maximum leave period provided for 
one employee (in some states, even though they may work for 
different employers). In California, if an employee's spouse 
is unemployed, the employee cannot take a leave. Likewise, in 
Oregon leave can be denied to an employee if another family 
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member to be a caregiver. In oregon, washington, 
the can deny leave to a husband and 
w1fe s1multaneously (1n some states, whether or not they work 
for the same employer). 
Employers in California, the District of Columbia New 
Jersey, and Washington can deny leave to high paid employees 
when necessary to avoid substantial economic to the 
employer's operations. In California and the D1strict of 
include an employee who is one of the 5 
h1ghest.pa1d or 1s among the top 10% in 9ross salary. In New 
1t an employee who is salar1ed and among the 
h19hest 5% or one of the 7 highest paid employees 
wh1chever 1s greater. In Washington it includes to 1 10% of 
the who are designated (in writing and d1splayed in 
a consp1cuous place) as "key personnel," or the highest paid 
10% of the employees. 
New Jersey has inserted a punitive clause in its 
statute stating that no employee shall, 
dur1ng the leave per1od, perform services on a full-time basis 
for whom.the emplo¥ee did not provide those 
serv1ces 1mmed1ately pr1or to tak1ng leave. However no 
sanctions are given for violators. ' 
Least Favorable to Employers: Hawaii Maine Rhode 
Island, and W1scons1n have no provis1ons 9ranting 
the r1ght to parental and family leave 1n given 
c1rcumstances or to certa1n classes of employees. 
,Most Favorable to Emploters: California, New Jersey, and 
Wash1ngton recogn1ze at leas two types of s1tuat1ons 1n which 
can den¥ or family leave to employees. 
Cal1forn1a has as open-ended provision which 
would perm1t an employer to deny leave if it would result in 
undue hardship to the employer's operations. 
J. Effects of leave on employee benefits. 
Preservation of rights and benefits which have accrued up 
to the of a leave period is standard for all the 
parental/fam1ly leave statutes. The laws differ in regard to 
whether or they 9ontinuation of benefits during 
the leave per1od. The D1str1ct of Columbia [88], New Jerset 
[89], Rhode Island [90], and W1scons1n [91J statutes 1nd1ca e 
employers shall continue certa1n benef1ts for employees 
wh1le on leave. 
law specifically states that the employer 
shall ma1nta1n.coverage under a group health insurance policy, 
a group subscr1ber contract, or a health care plan at the 
and.under the conditions coverage would have been 
prov1ded 1f the employee had continued to work. The law was 
challenged and was found to be pre-empted by the Employee 
Income Security Act with regard to any plans 
wh1ch would come within the jurisdiction of the federal 
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law (92). The legal issue of pre-empti?n apply t? . 
several other of the state's statutes w1th s1m1lar prov1s1ons. 
For the protection of employers, some states have a 
provision that employees pa¥ to the emplo¥er a of.money 
equal to the amount of the 1nsurance prem1ums wh1ch w1ll 
paid during the time of the leave. Rhode Island makes th1s 
payment a statutory requirement, adding that the employer 
shall return such payment to the employee days. 
following the employee's return to work. W1scons1n perm1ts 
employers to require an escrow payment for this purpose. 
California (93], Washington (94], and Oregon (95) have 
provis1ons wh1ch specif1cally absolve employers from 
requirements of continuing benefits during leave. California 
allows employers to refuse to make pension or retirement 
contributions during the leave. Washington's law states, 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to require the 
employer to grant benefits, including seniority or pension 
rights during any period of leave." Both states acknowledge 
the employees' rights to continue group health insurance plans 
at the employee's expense. Finally, under Oregon's law 
benefits are not required to accrue during the leave. 
Maine's [96) law requires that employers make it possible 
for employees to continue benefits at the employee's expense. 
Least Favorable to Emtloyers: Statutes which mandate 
continued benef1ts dur1nghe leave period include those of 
the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and 
Wiscons1n. 
Most Favorable to Rhode Island indicates a 
concern for the employers protection by requ1ring employees 
to make a prior payment to employers for the cost of . 
continuing benefits for the duration of the leave per1od. 
California, Washington, and Oregon allow employers to refuse 
to cont1nue certa1n benefits dur1ng that period. 
II. STATES MANDATING LEAVE FOR PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, 
ADOPTION OR CARE OF A NEWBORN OR NEWLY ADOPTED CHILD 
ONLY. (These statutes contain no provisions for care 
of an ill family member.) 
The following statutory provisions reflect a deliberate 
effort to abide by civil rights re9uirements concerning sex 
and pregnancy discrimination. It somewhat ironic that in 
an attempt to comply with those laws, several states have 
enacted laws which appear to violate those very laws. Part of 
the problem stems from the fact that it is legally necessary 
to treat pregnancy and childbirth the same as other temporary 
disabilities are treated, and that treating pregnancy more 
favorably than other temporary disabilities met with approval 
by the u.s. Supreme Court (97]. Since pregnancy and 
childbirth are biologically associated only with the female 
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gender, many of the statutes grant benefits such as leave only 
to female employees. As long as the benefits are tied to the 
related medical condition of pregnancy and childbirth there 
is no legal problem with grantin9 them only to 
However, as stated earlier, by child care leave with 
pregnancy and childbirth leave, and 9ranting the benefit only 
t? females, there can be a sex violation of 
VII as well as a potential constitutional question of equal protection (98). 
The followin9 statutes are presented in alphabetical 
order with code accompaniments for reference. Many are 
part of comprehensive fair employment practice or civil rights 
statutes. Key words have been highlighted to enable the reader to scan the significant facts. 
Iowa: Iowa Civil Act eregnant 
be g1ven leave for the1r per1od of d1sability or for 8 wee s, whichever is less (99). 
Kansas: The state's law against discrimination has been 
interpreted to require employers to grant a reasonable 
of leave to female emplolees for childbearing and to re1nstate 
her to her or1g1nal (or 1ke) pos1t1on after leave [100). 
Kentucky: The Fair Employment Practices law requires an 
employer to grant a reasonable leave up to six 6 weeks to care 
adopted child under the age of 7 (101). 
Louisiana: Under a pregnancy discrimination law an 
employer 1s required to grant a reasonable leave up 4 
disability for pregnancy or a related medical cond1t1on (102]. ---
Massachusetts: Maternity leave shall be granted to a 
female employee for birth or the adoption of a child under the 
a9e of 18, or 1f-cfie-chiTd-rs-pliys1ca11y or mentally 
d1sabled, under the a9e of 23. The emplo¥ee shall be restored 
to her original posit1on or a similar pos1tion with the same 
status, pay, length of service credit and seniority. However 
this does not apply if there is a layoff [103). ' 
Note: Massachusetts' law is likely to be in violation of 
the federal C1v1l R1ghts Act, Title VII. The EEOC recently 
that leaves t? females only, which are not 
to pregnane¥, or related medical 
cond1t1ons, may be 1n v1olat1on of the sex discrimination 
prohibitions of the law (104]. Clearly, a leave granted to a 
woman for the purpose of adoption does not involve a medical 
condition and is only for child care. It therefore should 
also be made available to male employees in order to be in compliance with federal law. 
Minnesota: Leave shall be granted to an employee who is 
a natural or parent in conjunction with the birth or 
adoption of a ch1ld. The leave may begin not more 
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weeks after the birth or adoption (105). The act covers employers with 21 or more employees at at 
least one site [106]. The length of the leave period weeks [107]. In addition to remedies otherwise prov1ded by law, a person may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages 
recoverable at law, together with cost and including reasonable attorney's fees, as well as 1n)unct1ve and other equitable relief at court's discretion (108). The employee shall be entitled to return to his or her 
former position or a position of comparable duties, number of 
hours and pay. However, if the emplo¥er experiences a layoff and the employee would have lost a pos1tion pursuant to a bona fide layoff and recall system, the employee is not entitled to reinstatement, but retains all other rights under the system 
as if the employee had not taken the leave [109]. 
The leave shall begin at a time requested b¥ the employee. The employer may adopt reasonable pol1cies 
governing the timing of requests for unpaid leave (110]. The employer shall continue to make coverage available to the employee, wh11e-on-1eave, under group 1nsurance, group subscriber contract, or health care plan for the employee and dependents. Nothing in this act requires the employer to pay 
the costs [111]. 
Montana: Under the state's Fair Employment Practices law, an employer must grant a reasonable leave for 
pregnancy/maternity, the length to be on a case-by-case bas1s. The employee must be re1nstated to her 
original or equivalent position [112]. 
New Hampshire: Under the state's law against 
discr1m1nat1on, leave is to be for temporary disability due to pregnancy ch1ldbirth or a related medical condition and to re1nstate the employer to the same or a 
comparable position unless business necessity makes it impossible or unreasonable (113). 
Tennessee: An employer must grant a full-time female 
employee up to 4 months leave for pregnancyh childbirth, and nurs1ng of her Infant and reinstate her to er or s1m1lar position unless the position is so unique 1t cannot be temporarily filled after reasonable efforts have been made or 
if the employee has used the leave to pursue other employment or has worked full-time for another employer during the 
leave. The act specifically excludes male employees from taking "maternity leave" (114]. 
Vermont: Under the state's pregnancy leave law, an 
employer must grant to 1 *ear to a female employee during 
pregnane! and follow1nA-oirt and reinstate her to the same or comparab e pos1t1on. n employee may seek relief for 
violation of the act in a private civil suit (115). 
Commentart: Because providing leave for childcare to females and no to males has been ruled as sex discrimination 
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law [116], states which run the risk of being 1nclude: Kentucky and Massachusetts (both of wh1ch mandate leave for female employees for adoption) and Vermont (which mandates leave for female employees for'up to a per1od of 1 year (unless it is clearly granted only when a related medical condition is involved). 
III. ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ADDRESSING FAMILY CONCERNS IN EMPLOYMENT. 
, The following statutory provisions are included to 1llustrate that other possibilities exist for addressing the need concerns in the context of employment. 
Creat1ve should be encouraged to propose statutory schemes wh1ch may better address the needs of employees with family obligations than the ones already enacted. 
, . California: Up to 4 per year must be granted for v1s1ts b¥ an to h1s or her child's school. Employers may requ1re a s1gned document verifying the visit [117]. 
Connecticut: In conjunction with its family and parental 
the of Labor shall report on the feas1b1l1ty of establ1sh1ng a statewide job bank of 
employees available to work for temporary periods of t1me (118]. 
Oregon: The Oregon family leave law is not applicable if the offers to.the employee a nondiscriminatory 
as def1ned by the IRS Code, providing as one of 1ts opt1ons a parental leave benefit that is at least equivalent to the benefit required by this act (119). 
, Nevada: It is a misdemeanor to terminate an employee who 1s a parent, guardian or custodian of a child and who (1) appears at a conference requested by an administrator of a school or (2) is notified during work of an emergency 
the child by a school (120]. In addition, 1t 1s an unlawful employment pract1ce to fail or refuse to 
leave to a pregnant female if such a benefit is prov1ded to employees for other med1cal reasons [121]. 
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing statutes, with their varied and sometimes conflicting definitions, remedies, and even major provisions 
P?Se a challenge for interstate employers who must w1th the numerous requ1rements relating to their 
employer-employee relationships. One solution would be for Congress to successfully pass a family/parental leave bill. Proponents of a national policy on parental leave are 
ab?ut balancing the needs of America's ch1ldren aga1nst the other demands made on their work1ng parents--demands which lead to the need for two-income 
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families and working mothers (122]. Others recognize a for a policy to help employees who choose to for ag1ng parents at a time when costs of health and nurs1ng care are rapidly increasing and people are living longer. 
There is reason to believe that a federal law which would 
provide minimum benefits andfor leave to employees.would be acceptable to employers. Many large corporate bus1nesses already make parental/family leave available to their workers 
and, as women become a larger the workforce,. management will respond to the1r needs 1n order to reta1n 
them. A recent study of 700 firms conducted by the National Chamber Foundation of the U. s. Chamber of Commerce revealed 
that 77 percent of the firms implemented policies that addressed the parental leave needs of workers (123). The 
benefits to employers of making family/parental available to the workforce include greater product1v1ty, better quality of job performance, and reductions in 
absenteeism, tardiness, turnover, and stress. 
A federal law would establish uniform regulations to ease 
the burden on interstate employers. However, although the federal bill contains a preemption provision, it makes clear that states which pass leave laws more favorable to employees shall not be superseded by the federal law. The problem of 
conflicting statutory requirements would therefore still 
exist. A Uniform Family/Parental Leave Act may better address 
this problem. Those wanting to s?me of job securit¥ for workers 1n the face of 1ncreas1ng fam1ly responsibil1ties and rising health costs, could turn to the 
Uniform Act and select from alternative provisions those which best fit their needs. Although the states may choose 
different options, there would be a standardization of definitions, remedies, and language which would make both compliance and enforcement more effective. 
Although small businesses have voiced opposition to a 
federal mandatory leave law on the basis of cost, the fact that all the states' leave laws as well as the proposed 
federal bill require only unpaid leave, leads to 
believe that the c?st burden 1s A argument of small business 1s that when a bus1ness 1s requ1red by law to offer one type of benefit for its workforce, the effect is to make it more costly to offer varied benefit packages for 
workers with different needs. It has been suggested that a better alternative to mandated leave is to provide tax credits to employers who provide such leave (124]. 
The United States has been compared unfavorably to other 
western industrialized nations regarding its national and 
state policies on emplo¥IDent security issues, in 9eneral, parental leave, in part1cular. Most of those nat1ons prov1de 
medical care or health insurance for pregnane¥, and have maternity leave benefits which include a spec1fied leave 
before and after childbirth, in addition to replacement of all or some of the wages lost during the leave and a guarantee of 
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job reinstatement (125]. Although in those countries the 
burden is by the taxpayers than by employers, mandated unpa1d leave may not be too h19h a price to pay to the economic and social wellbe1ng of the American 
of laws regard them as reasonable m1n1mum requ1rements wh1ch would secure the jobs of employees whose family responsibilities might otherwise lead to loss of employment, compounding already stressful situations. 
In conclusion, the objectives of parental and family leave laws can be met through either a federal statute or 
through the continued enactment of statutes in the individual The situation can be problematic for large bus1nesses since the statutes present an arra¥ of requ1rements whi?h makes difficult for such organizat1ons 
to compl¥· A Un1form Fam1ly/Parenta1 Leave Act is a possible alternat1ve solution to that problem. 
Beyond the statutory schemes presented above are other alternatives which could be explored by employers such as 
child care, flexible work schedules for 
parents, home and job sharing arrangements. Leg1slators could cons1der other creative solutions to the 
problem, such as tax credits to parents for childcare 
tax.benefits to employers to encourage policies a1med at help1ng who are burdened with family Wh1ch affect their employment, or laws 
s1m1lar to Nevada's and California's which require employers 
to be in regard to employees who must attend to the educat1onal needs of their children by meeting with school personnel during working hours. 
The challenge for legislators at both the national and state level is to fashion laws which can satisfactorily meet 
the of both employees and employers and at the same time accompl1sh the larger, societal objectives of a workforce without compromising the employees' ab1lity to meet family obligations outside of the workplace. 
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MAKING SENSE OF RULES IOb-5 AND 14e-3 
by 
Susan Lorde Martin* 
I. Introduction 
Npw that the eighties are gone and Michael 
Mil ken and Ivan Boesky and other high profile securities 
traders have served tlme in jail, the relative calm in Wall 
Street "wheeling and dealing" presents a wonderful 
for Congress to finally clarify insider trading law. 
Al thougp the newspapers have been full of insider trading 
stories and numbers of highly publifized insider trading 
cases have come before the courts, Congress has never 
clarified what insider trading is and what specific behavior 
should be prohibited. Leaving these "details" to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts has 
resulted in wrangling between the former and the latter and in 
a body of law that does not make much sense. 
·This article will first discuss the Congressional purpose 
and methods for prohibiting insider trading. Then, SEC Rules 
lOb-5 and 14e-3 will be explained and compared. The 
comparison will show that the statutes authorizing the SEC to 
promulgate those rules are not identical and, therefore, the 
letter of the law does not require those rules to be 
interpreted identically. Nevertheless, there is no policy 
reason to have rules prohibiting insider trading vary 
depending on whether or not the securities being traded are 
the subject of a tender offer. Therefore, this article 
concludes that Congress, in order to create coherent insider 
trading law, should explicitly indicate which of the two rules 
has been properly interpreted by the courts. Application of 
the rules is difficult enough without having the additional 
burden of incongruous policy. 
II. Prohibiting Insider Trading 
Congress has made clear its intention to stop insider 
trading as well as other market practices it considers abusive 
in order to maintain confidence in the fairness of the 
securities markets. The stock market crash 
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